Summary: the university of Michigan password creation policy seems fine, if not optimal
Explanation:
NIST Special Publication 800-63 (currently version "-3") (titled "Digital Identity Guidelines") is the go-to guideline for password security. Among others, they recommend the following:
However, if you combine points 1 and 4 from above, then you may end up with simple, easy to guess passwords. Thus, it is advocated(5) that it's better to use passphrases rather than passwords, which can be safer even if they are simple in structure (e.g. all lowercase characters).
Is there any professional consensus on what the optimal password minimum length requirement should be?
If you take a look at the password cracking table from Hive, that shows how much time it takes to brute-force a password that complies with specific complexity rules, you'll see that an 8-character-password with complex character combination is easily brute-forced in 5 minutes. Going from there, you either need an 12-character password with complex creation rules or 15 characters with only lowercase characters (numbers-only-passwords are inherently unsafe).
Given that the university of Michigan permits lowercase-only character passwords, a length of 15 characters for passwords seems optimal.
Edit (based on your comments here and here): Security controls are not selected at random and policies are not set "just because". They are based on research and lessons learned. In the case of optimum password length, please read above and follow the provided links.
As a summary, long password lengths are not set in order to counter attempts using the login process of the system. If that would the case, passwords would be much, much shorter. For example, if your system locks accounts after 5 failed attempts, then with a 4-character-long password, that consists of numbers and lowercase characters only, you get 36^4(6) = 1.679.616(7) possible combinations. This number is high enough to accept the risk of 5 login attempts from an attacker (less than 0,0003%(8) probability of success). In other words, this attack vector (login attempts) is assessed and the security control in place (limit attempts to 5) is said to mitigate the risk.
However, a threat model that includes someone stealing the password db, needs to also account for password spraying or credential stuffing attacks to other systems. This is done in order to counter for lateral movements of attackers in the same network or denying them access to other networks (because humans tend to use the same password on different systems). In other words, we need to limit the blast radius of a stolen password. In order to do this, we need to make it difficult for an attacker to find out what the password is; if you used a 4 character password, any attacker, with trivial resources, would be able to brute force it in under a second. That is why you need to use longer passwords and this is where the minimum password lengths, relevant research, alternative authentication ways and the official guidelines come in.
You need to understand that information security is not a single-dimensional discipline.
1 "Memorized secrets SHALL be at least 8 characters in length if chosen by the subscriber"
2 "Verifiers SHOULD permit subscriber-chosen memorized secrets at least 64 characters in length"
3 "Verifiers SHOULD NOT require memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily (e.g., periodically). However, verifiers SHALL force a change if there is evidence of compromise of the authenticator"
4 "Verifiers SHOULD NOT impose other composition rules (e.g., requiring mixtures of different character types or prohibiting consecutively repeated characters) for memorized secrets"
5 "Use easy-to-remember passphrases rather than passwords, that have a minimum of 14 characters"
6 26 characters (a-z) and 10 numbers (0-9)
7 the dot is used as a separator of thousands
8 comma is used as a decimal point
Password1!
) but a passphrase (e.g.bound dollar toss
<- that's 17 characters) – schroeder Sep 15 '23 at 08:02